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POLICY CHALLENGE
Policymakers face three main challenges. First, addressing unemployment
and poverty should remain a high priority not only for its own sake, but
because these problems undermine public debt sustainability and growth.
Second, bold policies in various areas are required. Most labour, social and
fiscal policies are the responsi-
bility of member states,
requiring national reforms. But
better coordination of demand
management at European level
is also necessary in order to
create jobs. Third, tax/benefit
systems should be reviewed
for improved efficiency, inter-
generational equity and fair
burden sharing between the
wealthy and poor.
GDP and unemployment in Europe and the USA
THE ISSUE The European Union faces major social problems. More than six
million jobs were lost from 2008-13 and poverty has increased. Fiscal con-
solidation has generally attempted to spare social protection from
spending cuts, but the distribution of adjustment costs between the young
and old has been uneven; a growing generational divide is evident, disad-
vantaging the young. The efficiency of the social security systems of EU
countries varies widely. Countries with greater inequality tended to have
higher household borrowing prior to the crisis resulting in more subdued
consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, high
unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education undermine
long-term growth and social and political stability.
Source: Bruegel. Note: rhs = right-hand scale; lhs = left-hand scale.
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EUROPE’S SOCIAL PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
1. The severe material
deprivation rate indi-
cates the proportion of
people who cannot
afford at least four of
the nine following
items: 1) utility bills
and loan payments; 2)
one week’s annual holi-
day away from home;
3) a meal with meat,
chicken, fish (or vege-
tarian equivalent) every
second day; 4) unex-
pected financial
expenses; 5) a tele-
phone (including
mobile phone); 6) a
colour TV; 7) a washing
machine; 8) a car and
9) heating to keep the
home adequately
warm.
2. European Commis-
sion (2014).  
EUROPE FACES major social prob-
lems. More than six million jobs
were lost between 2008 and
2013 in the European Union,
increasing the number of unem-
ployed people to more than 26
million and an unemployment
rate of almost 11 percent in 2013,
the highest in more than two
decades. Poverty, as measured
by the share of severely materi-
ally deprived people, increased to
9.9 percent by 20121. Income
inequality, as measured by the
Gini-coefficient, remained at the
same level in 2012 as in 2007,
but it is now higher than three
decades ago.
However, Europe's social prob-
lems are diverse and there has
been increasing divergence,
especially within the euro area.
Prior to the crisis, income inequal-
ity in different EU countries
reflected the diversity of social
models. Income inequality levels
in Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom were well above the
levels in the core EU countries.
During the crisis, southern Europe
countries in particular went
through worrying social develop-
ments2. But it is not only the north
and south that are diverging.
Latvia is the most unequal coun-
try in Europe and Slovenia is the
most equitable. While 44 percent
of people are severely materially
deprived in Bulgaria, the rate in
Luxembourg is only 1 percent.
Before the crisis, Europe’s social
model was generally thought to
be not especially growth friendly,
but to be able to provide adequate
social protection. With the crisis,
its ability to protect the most vul-
nerable has been seriously
questioned. According to Euro-
barometer (2012), 80 percent of
respondents think that poverty
has increased in their own coun-
try over the past 12 months. The
social fall-out from the crisis has
put issues of social fairness, the
impact of income inequality and
unemployment, and their impact
on economic growth at the centre
of the economic policy debate.
This Policy Brief assesses the
developments in unemployment,
poverty and inequality and their
impact on economic growth and
the sustainability of public
finance. We argue that current
levels of unemployment and
poverty are not only undesirable,
but also undermine the short and
long-term growth potential of
Europe’s economies, with nega-
tive implications for the
sustainability of public debt. The
last section discusses possible
policy choices, which mostly but
not exclusively will fall to national
policy makers.
MAIN SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE EU
Inequality also reflects choices
related to the social models of dif-
ferent countries. Inequality has
been on the rise since about 1980
in several advanced economies,
while it was high in developing
and emerging countries even
before that. A commonly used
indicator for income inequality is
the so-called Gini coefficient,
which shows that income
inequality increased in almost
every EU country from 1987-
2007 (Figure 1). The level of
income inequality in Europe
varies: while it is below the aver-
age measured in emerging and
developing countries, it is similar
to the US level in, for example,
Latvia, the United Kingdom,
Lithuania and Portugal, but it is
much lower in Slovenia, Denmark
and Slovakia.
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Source: Bruegel based on Standardised World Income Inequality Database.
Figure 1: Gini index of income inequality, post taxes and transfers, 1987 and 2007
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3. For example Alvaredo
et al (2013).
4. Three quarters of the
reduction in inequality
is due to transfers,
while the remaining
quarter is the conse-
quence of direct
household taxation,
according to OECD
(2012a).
5. For a comprehensive
overview of the devel-
opments of social
indicators in Europe,
see Darvas et al
(2014).
6. In Table 1 we
grouped countries into
a few broad groups for
readability.
reduce it only by 20 percent. For
countries with less efficient redis-
tribution systems, a reform of the
social model would therefore
appear to be a promising avenue,
with the potential to reduce sub-
stantially government spending
without increasing income
inequality. Given the pressure on
public finances and the doubts
about the sustainability of public
finances in some countries, such
reforms appear indispensable.
However, it is also clear that these
are not one-dimensional choices.
Some social measures might not
be targeted at reducing income
inequality, but rather at pursuing
other socially desirable goals.
The economic crisis has led to a
significant deterioration of the
social situation in a number of EU
countries. In particular, (long-
term) unemployment, youth
unemployment and poverty have
increased substantially in most
EU members5. Generally, the
increase in poverty and unem-
ployment has been more
pronounced in countries that
already had higher levels of
inequality pre-crisis, in particular
the countries of southern Europe
and the Baltics. However, in terms
of income inequality, the effects
of the crisis have been less
clearly distributed. In some
cases, income inequality actually
fell in EU countries in severe
recessions because of falls in the
top incomes. In other countries,
however, income inequality has
increased significantly.
DID FISCAL ADJUSTMENT DURING
THE CRISIS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE NEEDS OF THE POOR?
Most EU countries underwent sig-
nificant fiscal consolidation in the
last few years. An important ques-
tion is whether this adjustment
tried to preserve spending cate-
gories that are of central
importance for unemployment
and social stability. In the EU as a
whole, spending cuts were con-
centrated in broad public
services, economic affairs and
environment protection, while in
general spending on social pro-
tection was preserved at least in
relative terms, even in the coun-
tries that implemented the largest
fiscal adjustments (Table 1)6. 
The increase in income inequality
was particularly pronounced for
the top income share in a number
of countries. Recent research3
shows that the share of pre-tax
income accruing to the top 1 per-
cent of earners has increased
significantly in the United States,
the UK and Ireland, while in conti-
nental European countries this
increase was far less pronounced.
The efficiency of social security
systems varies widely in different
EU countries. Sapir (2006) argued
that the efficiency of the Mediter-
ranean social model is low and at
the same time inequality levels
are high. More recent data corrob-
orates this finding. Figure 2 shows
that most Mediterranean coun-
tries, but also some northern
European countries, achieve com-
paratively lower reductions of
income inequality for any given
amount of social expenditure and
for a given level of average per-
sonal income taxes4. For example,
the share of social expenditure is
similar in Greece and Denmark,
but while the Danish system is
able to reduce income-inequality
by 45 percent, the Greek can
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
IT
LV
LT
LU
HU
NL AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
10 15 20 25
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
IT
LV
LTLU HU
NL AT
PL
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
24 28 32 36 40 44
Average social expenditure, % GDP Average implicit personal income tax rate
Av
er
ag
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 m
ar
ke
t i
nc
om
e
in
eq
ua
lit
y 
(%
)
Av
er
ag
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 m
ar
ke
t i
nc
om
e
in
eq
ua
lit
y 
(%
)
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat’s Government expenditure statistics, Eurostat’s implicit tax rates by economic function
and the Standardised World Income Inequality Database. Note: the reduction in market income inequality is the percent
difference between the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers and the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers.
Figure 2: Correlation between the reduction of market income inequality and fiscal indicators, 2000-11
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The distribution of the costs of
adjustment between young and
old has been uneven. Spending
on families and children, unem-
ployment, education, health,
sickness and other social protec-
tion increased below inflation – a
cut in real terms. By contrast,
spending on housing and old age
increased more than inflation7.
The picture is different for differ-
ent sub-groups of countries. In
the three euro-area countries with
full Troika programmes and in the
three Baltic countries, cuts were
much more substantial across the
board, reflecting the significant
fiscal consolidation needs. How-
ever, in relative terms, one can
observe that certain spending
items seem to have been spared
from cuts. In particular, spending
on the elderly was preserved or
increased substantially. While
spending on the unemployed
also increased significantly,
unemployment benefits per
unemployed person declined
(Figure 3). This indicates reduced
benefits per person, but also
reduced eligibility8. Such declines
suggest that automatic stabilisers
are not allowed to take their full
effect in countries facing the
sharpest fiscal adjustment needs.
Spending on families and children
was cut quite substantially in the
programme countries, the Baltics,
Italy and Spain. Even in the core EU
countries, such spending was cut
in real terms. We found that child
poverty increased more in coun-
tries that cut family and child
benefits more and therefore these
cuts were not purely efficiency-
inducing. Spending on education
has declined even in nominal
terms in the countries facing the
most severe fiscal adjustment
needs, but also in real terms in
other country groups.
The crisis has brought to the fore
an increasing generational divide.
Probably related to the composi-
tion of social spending described
above, social indicators for the
elderly showed little deterioration
and in fact the severe material
deprivation rate for elderly people
has declined during the past five
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Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat. Note: see the definition of country groups
and the method of aggregation in the notes to Table 1.
Figure 3: Unemployment benefit payments per number of unemployed,
€ thousands per year7. From 2009 to 2012,
the number of people
over 65 years
increased by 5 percent
(there is no compre-
hensive dataset on the
number of pensioners)
and the number of chil-
dren decreased by 1
percent in the EU, but
social spending on fam-
ilies and children was
preserved much less
than spending on the
elderly.
8. In Greece, only 15
percent of unemployed
people receive unem-
ployment benefits from
the government.
Table 1: General government expenditure by function, % change 2009-
12 (in current prices and constant exchange rates) 
EU24 (share)
EU24
Greece, Ireland,
Portugal
Italy, Spain
9 other EU15
Baltics
7 other CEE
Total general govt. expenditure 100 4 -12 1 6 -3 7
Interest payments 5 23 14 32 19 164 22
Broad services 17 -2 -12 -11 2 -15 -1
Economic affairs 9 -5 -45 5 -6 -20 -4
Environment protection 2 -5 -26 -8 -4 -6 21
Health, recreation 17 4 -20 -7 8 -6 12
Education 11 2 -14 -10 5 -7 8
Old age 20 10 0 8 10 15 13
Family and children 4 0 -19 -10 3 -14 1
Housing 1 12 -30 6 13 23 20
Unemployment 4 0 11 14 -5 13 -11
Sickness and disability 6 7 -7 -1 9 -5 12
Other social protection 5 7 -11 5 9 26 8
Memorandum: inflation 8 6 8 7 12 10
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat’s ‘General government expenditure by function’ (COFOG) data-
base. Note: Belgium, Croatia, Slovakia and Romania are not included because of lack of data;
we report data for the aggregate of the remaining 24 countries of the EU (EU24). EU15 refers to
EU members before 2004. CEE refers to central and eastern European countries that joined the
EU in 2004-07. For the Baltic states the 2008-12 period is shown, because fiscal consolidation
started earlier in these countries. The aggregates for countries with different currencies were
calculated using constant exchange rates (the average of 2009-13) and therefore exchange
rate fluctuations do not affect the values shown. Broad services include: general public serv-
ices except interest payments, defence, public order and safety and community amenities.
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9. Poverty among the
elderly declined up to
2010, but increased
slightly in 2011-12,
though there was a
decline overall between
2007 and 2012, as
Figure 4 shows.
10. Ostry et al (2014).
11. Rajan (2010), and
Cynamon and Fazzari
(2014).
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in the long term. In the short-term,
there are different dynamics.
Deep recession can lead to signif-
icant increases in unemployment
and thereby affect long-term
growth. A number of different
channels can be identified.
A first and important line of argu-
ment is that rising income
inequality has led to excessive
borrowing by low-income house-
holds, which eventually became
unsustainable. In the US, there is
strong evidence11 that with the
decreasing amount of income
going to the bottom 95 percent of
the income distribution, those
households borrowed on a sub-
stantial scale and they did so to
buy houses and consume more.
Consequently, consumption
inequality has been less pro-
nounced than income inequality.
With the bursting of the housing
bubble, the heavily indebted fam-
ilies in the bottom 95 percent
income distribution could not
borrow more to smooth consump-
tion. This resulted in weaker
consumption trends and
attempts to repair balance sheets
slowed down the recovery. Bal-
ance sheet problems in the
household sector are also impor-
tant in a number of European
years, which is certainly a benign
development (Figure 4)9. But
social indicators suggest that the
younger generation has suffered
seriously: children who live now
in households in which their par-
ents no longer work and young
people who are not in work or edu-
cation. There is now a serious
danger that a lost generation
might develop in several member
states, which would undermine
medium- and long-term growth
prospects for the whole conti-
nent, adding to social and human
costs. 
UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Unemployment, poverty and
inequality are linked with long-
and short-term economic growth.
The relationship and causality
between the different factors is
complex. A central argument in
many earlier discussions focused
on the beneficial long-term
effects of inequality: that re-dis-
tributive measures would reduce
incentives for workers to perform
well, hamper entrepreneurship
and undermine productivity
growth. Yet, more recently, the
drawbacks of inequality have
moved back to the centre of the
debate. A recent International
Monetary Fund study, for exam-
ple, found that lower net
inequality is correlated with faster
and more durable growth and
there is surprisingly little evi-
dence for the growth-destroying
effects of fiscal redistribution at
the macroeconomic level10.
Long-term unemployment, which
can deepen poverty and inequal-
ity, undermines productivity also
0
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Children: below 18 years; working age: 18
to 64 years; Elderly: over 65 years.
Figure 4: Severe material deprivation rate in the EU27, 2007 vs 2012
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Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat (household debt) and Standardised World
Income Inequality Database (Gini coefficient).
Figure 5: Gini coefficient vs the change in household debt pre-crisis
countries. Interestingly, countries
with increasing household debt
tend to be those that have higher
levels of inequality (Figure 5).
Therefore, one cannot exclude the
hypothesis that large increases in
borrowing in a number of EU coun-
tries was related to the higher
levels of inequality, and that this
inequality contributed to the
build-up of the problems of today.
High household debt levels are a
significant drag on consumption
growth (Figure 6) and undermine
the correction of social imbal-
ances. History shows that the
deleveraging process exerted a
protracted negative impact on
economic growth12. Low economic
growth, in turn, undermines the
ability of economies to create
new jobs and to find ways to
reduce income inequality. The
substantial debt problems of
many euro-area countries there-
fore not only undermine growth,
but in themselves are also an
obstacle to the reduction of social
problems in the monetary union.
High and persistently high levels
of unemployment undermine
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both short-term and long-term
growth potential, and increase
inequality. Three factors are cen-
tral. First, unemployed people do
not contribute to the current pro-
ductive process, thereby
increasing the pressure on those
working to provide all the
resources needed. Second, the
unemployed consume less and
thereby domestic demand is
weaker in countries with higher
unemployment rates13. Third, the
longer unemployment persists,
the more work-related skills are
lost and the more difficult re-inte-
gration into the active labour
market becomes. Unemployment
among young people, which is at
record high in a number of EU
countries, is especially alarming
because a long period of unem-
ployment after graduation, when
a worker should acquire the first
skills in the workplace, can under-
mine whole careers – creating a
lost generation and also having
trickle-down effects on fertility
rates and child support. When
children grow up in families in
which parents do not work for long
periods or work irregularly, their
opportunities are curtailed com-
pared to children whose parents
work. Unemployment therefore
increases income inequality for
those directly affected and it
might also have lasting effects on
income inequality for the next
generation. Long-term unemploy-
ment is also a major determinant
of poverty. While short-term
unemployment can usually be
bridged by households thanks to
savings and unemployment ben-
efits, the longer a period of
unemployment lasts, the greater
the risk of falling into poverty14.
Poverty and persistent unem-
ployment also undermine the
ability of households to provide
for adequate healthcare for the
family and education of children.
The resulting inequality of oppor-
tunity, ie the ability to access
education on equal terms with
families in which the parents are
in jobs, is an important problem.
The OECD (2012b) finds that in all
OECD countries, higher levels of
economic, social and cultural
status of parents is associated
with higher educational attain-
ments for their children. Rising
unemployment, reductions in
wealth and relative social decline
therefore undermine the educa-
tional opportunities for children.
Unemployment can also under-
mine growth and financial
stability by affecting social stabil-
ity and undermining support for
positive change. Eurobarometer
surveys show that the change in
citizens’ trust in the EU and in
national governments has
evolved in a broadly similar way
and in general there was a greater
decline in trust in countries facing
high unemployment. When trust
in EU and domestic political insti-
12. See McKinsey
Global Institute (2012)
and Ruscher and Wolff
(2012).
13. See, for example,
Hurd and Rohwedder
(2011) and Christelis et
al (2011).
14. In a panel
regression framework,
Duiella and Turrini
(2014) found that long-
term unemployment
appears the most
significant and robust
explanatory factor for
severe material
deprivation, stronger
than income-per-capita
variables.
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Figure 6: Change in household debt before the crisis vs consumption
growth during the crisis
tutions is low, the acceptability of
painful structural reforms and
fiscal consolidation measures is
lower, which could diminish the
reform momentum and may even
lead to political instability.
Overall, a number of EU countries
face a serious unemployment
and poverty challenge, undermin-
ing the opportunities for personal
fulfilment, reducing economic
growth and threatening public
finances. With households under
pressure and social support
budgets affected, support for
national and EU authorities has
tumbled to record lows.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
A number of conclusions can be
drawn from the analysis.
First, addressing unemployment
and poverty should remain a high
priority not only for its own sake,
but also in view of the sustain-
ability of public debt and the
growth rates of our economies.
• High levels of unemployment
undermine long-term growth;
• Youth unemployment in partic-
ular can have lasting negative
effects, as skills are under-
mined over the whole lifetime,
with trickle-down effects on fer-
tility rates and child support;
• Poverty undermines the ability
to access educational and
health services, with a knock-
on negative effect on long-term
productivity;
• Excessive income inequality
might raise the risk of exces-
sive household borrowing
leading to later periods of sub-
dued consumption growth;
• Poverty and unemployment
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15. ‘Actions to foster
youth employment in
the Member States’,
Declaration of the EU
Ministers of Labour and
the Commissioner for
Employment, Social
Affairs and Inclusion
agreed at the Conference
on Youth Employment,
Berlin, 3 July 2013.
16. European
Commission (2013).
17. See Darvas and
Vihriälä (2013).
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undermine trust in government
and might hamper reform;
• The resulting reform fatigue
and weaker short-term recov-
ery and medium-term
potential growth adversely
affect the sustainability of
public finances. In turn, weaker
public finances necessitate
larger fiscal adjustments,
thereby adversely effecting
social developments.
Second, addressing social prob-
lems requires actions in various
policy fields both at national and
European levels.
• Most of the labour, social and
fiscal policies sit with member
states. Inefficient labour mar-
kets should be reformed,
training schemes should be
improved, tax/benefit systems
should be better targeted and
aligned with the needs of the
poor and unemployed;
• European initiatives include an
agreement between EU
employment ministers and the
European Commission that
youth unemployment requires
urgent action15, the mobilisa-
tion of a €6 billion youth
guarantee fund, and a Commis-
sion communication on the
“social dimension of economic
and monetary union”16. While
such initiatives are welcome,
they are unlikely to trigger a
break-though and may even
raise expectations that cannot
be met, further undermining
the trust of citizens in the EU;
• Another European level initia-
tive should be a greater focus
on demand management. In
our view, weak demand has
been a major reason for job
losses and social problems,
even though fiscal consolida-
tion was necessary in a
number of member states. If
demand remains low, more
flexible labour markets will not
create employment to the
extent needed. However, the
EU countries facing the most
severe social problems are
unable to support demand
with fiscal tools, because of
their weak public finance posi-
tions. Therefore, European ini-
tiatives are wanted, such as:
– Better use of the European
Semester to achieve an opti-
mal aggregate fiscal stance
for at least the euro area, but
preferably for the EU17;
– Fostering public investment
when there is a need and the
fiscal space allows;
– More EU investment projects
using project bonds and more
forceful EIB lending; and
– The discussion on a euro-
area budget should be
revived to help adapting the
aggregate fiscal stance of
the euro area to the aggre-
gate economic situation and
to limit that in the future
fiscal consolidations have to
be particularly severe in
those countries that would
most need fiscal policy to
stabilise the situation;
• More demand would help to
reverse the chronically low
inflation in the euro area, which
would foster private sector
deleveraging, sustainability of
public finance and the intra-
euro price adjustment.
Third, tax/benefit systems should
be reviewed for improved effi-
ciency, intergenerational equity
and fair burden sharing between
the wealthy and poor.
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• We showed that the same
levels of social expenditure
and household taxation are
translating into very different
reductions in market income
inequality in different EU coun-
tries. This suggests that there
is scope for reducing govern-
ment spending without
undermining the achievement
of goals in countries with ineffi-
cient welfare systems; 
• We also showed that the fiscal
adjustment was greater for
families with children and
earners might not hamper eco-
nomic growth18. Wealth taxes
and inheritance taxes have
recently been considered as
further revenue sources that
would reduce the tax burden
on the disadvantaged. Since
taxing high incomes and
wealth might induce migration
of the wealthy to less-taxed
countries, such tax measures
require European and interna-
tional tax cooperation and
should again be discussed at
European level.
18. Piketty and Saez
(2012).
education than for pensioners.
While pensioners should be
protected, the deteriorating
social condition of the young
has long-term consequences
for public finances and growth.
Therefore, when efficiency-
inducing spending cuts are not
available, inter-generational
equity should play a greater role
in the design of fiscal policies;
• The recent debate on the pro-
gressiveness of the tax system
suggests that a greater contri-
bution from the highest
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